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Abstract 
Feminist legal scholars argue that the rigid, formalist approach towards judicial 
decision-making is potentially harmful to the lives, experiences, and interests of women.  In 
critically analysing a feminist re-judgement within Feminist Judgments From Theory to 
Practice, this dissertation argues that the Feminist Judgments Project represents a legitimate 
and valuable approach, which effectively re-imagines judicial decision-making in line with 
women’s interests. This dissertation reinforces feminist judicial decision-making as a more 
responsive form of judgment making particularly for vulnerable and marginalised women 
whom regularly experience and are subjected to traditional judicial approaches. Further, the 
dissertation argues that feminist judicial decision-making constitutes a legitimate and valuable 
approach despite considerable criticism levelled at this methodology and judges who openly 
hold feminist beliefs. The dissertation positions the Feminist Judgments Project within the 
context of the legal realist approach to judicial decision-making, which serves as a critique of 
the formalist approach to judicial decision-making. The dissertation's analysis of the feminist 
re-judgment of R v Dhaliwal (R v D)2 aims to promote the Feminist Judgments Project’s 
methodological approach as a mode of judicial best practice. This dissertation concludes that 
feminist judicial decision-making is a legitimate and valuable approach which recognises 
social inequalities and amplifies marginalised communities, whilst also remaining faithful to 
legal conventions. 
 
Keywords:  
Judicial decision-making, Legal Formalism, Legal Realism, Feminist Judicial Decision-
Making, Feminism, Legal Realism, Legitimacy, Justice. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction – ‘A grievous judicial backsliding on equality…the burning need for 
action’.3  
 
‘Although the rhetoric of substantive equality continues, the promise of genuine 
substantive equality is fading and the voices of equality advocates are being muted.’4 
 
‘What if a group of feminist scholars were to write the ‘missing’ feminist judgment in key 
cases?’5 
 
‘Dissenting opinions…have encouraged a blossoming of legal conceptions and solutions, 
without going so far as to cast a pall of dysfunctional dissonance over the courts’.6 
 
 
1.1 Background and the Problem 
In recent years, the disparity between the numbers of men and women appointed to the 
judiciary has evoked concern within and beyond the legal system; advancing judicial diversity 
to the top of the Judicial Appointments Committee’s (JAC) and the wider judiciary’s agenda.7 
The diversity of the judiciary is viewed as being ‘constitutionally significant’ by the House of 
Lords especially in terms of maintaining public confidence in the judiciary, developing the law, 
and  discussions around justice.8 Although the Lord Chief Justice of England and Wales reports 
a 3% increase in the numbers of women appointed to the bench from 2018-2019, progress to 
establish an equal representation of women from all backgrounds within the judiciary remains 
slow.9 By promoting the appointment of judges from more diverse backgrounds, the JAC 
aspire to ensure that both the visible exterior of the common law and the more ambiguous 
                                                        
3 Diana Majury, ‘Introducing the Women’s Court of Canada’ (2006) 18 Canadian Journal of Women and the Law 1 
4 Ibid 
5 Rosemary Hunter, Clare McGlynn, and Erika Rackley, Feminist Judgments From Theory to Practice (Hart Publishing, 2010) P 3  
6 Claire L’Hereux-Dubé, ‘The Dissenting Voice of The Future’ (2000) 38 Osgoode Hall Law Journal 496 
7  Constitutional Reform Act 2005, Section 64 
;Equality Act 2010, Section 149 (1); Baroness Brenda Hale of Richmond, ‘Judges, Power and Accountability Constitutional Implications of 
Judicial Selection’ (Belfast, Constitutional Law Summer School, 2017) 4 
8 House of Lords Select Committee on the Constitution, Judicial Appointments Report (2012, House of Lords) 26 
9 Lord Chief Justice of England and Wales and Senior President of Tribunals, ‘Judicial Diversity Statistics 2019’ (Lord Chief Justice of 
England and Wales and Senior President of Tribunals, 2019) 1  
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nature of the judicial decision-making process in England and Wales is upheld as being 
‘legitimate, qualitative, fair’ and valuable by wider society.10 Although many initiatives aim to 
ameliorate the external image of the law by diversifying the judiciary, similar such efforts 
aimed at addressing the internal issues within the judicial decision-making process, which 
threaten to undermine public confidence in the common law are extremely limited.  
Indeed, the restricted focus upon the inherent structural issues within the judicial 
decision-making process is reinforced by feminist scholars who highlight the consistent 
production of ‘unjust’, ‘gendered’, ‘incorrect’, and ‘wrong’ judicial decisions which negatively 
and disproportionately impact upon the lives and experiences of women and marginalised 
people.11 MacKinnon who argues that the law’s legitimacy is ‘based on force at women’s 
expense’ reinforces these observations of judicial decision-making. 12  These findings by 
feminist scholars are particularly concerning when the legitimacy of the common law and the 
subsequent societal compliance with judge made law is dependent upon the ‘just’ treatment of 
all people before the court by the judiciary. 13  Fundamentally, these findings by feminist 
scholars exacerbate wider concerns that the existing formalist, rigid approach to judicial 
decision-making renders the common law an ineffective tool to respond to the social issues it 
is invoked to adjudicate.14 Crucially, this research demonstrating the coercive application of 
the law towards selected and vulnerable groups also erodes the significant level of trust placed 
in the judiciary to produce fair, just, and equitable outcomes for all.  
The focus on promoting a greater level of diversity, accommodating the notion of 
difference, and diminishing bias within the judiciary to ensure that the common law maintains 
                                                        
10 House of Lords Select Committee on the Constitution, Judicial Appointments: follow up (House of Lords, 7th Report of Session 2017–19, 
November 2017) 33; Justice, ‘Increasing Judicial Diversity’ (Justice, April 2017) 5 
11 Rosemary Hunter, ‘The Power of Feminist Judgments’ (2012) 20 Feminist Legal Studies 137; Mairead Enright, Julie McCandless and Aoife 
O’Donoghue, Northern/Irish Feminist Judgments: Judges’ Troubles and the Gendered Politics of Identity (Hart Publishing, 2017) P 3; Bridget 
J Crawford, Anthony C Infanti, Feminist Judgments: Rewritten Tax Opinions (CUP, 2017) P 45 
12 Catherine A Mackinnon, Toward a Feminist Theory of the State (HUP, 1989) P 249 
13 Johnson, Maguire and Kuhns, ‘Public Perceptions of the Legitimacy of the Law and Legal Authorities: Evidence from the Caribbean’ (2014) 
48 Law and Society Review 984 
14Rosemary Hunter, ‘The Power of Feminist Judgments’ (2012) 20Feminist Legal Studies 137; Adam Gearey and John Gardner, Law and 
Aesthetics (Hart Publishing, 2001) P 2 
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its external image of legitimacy is commended.15 However, while securing a more diverse 
judiciary may go some way to ensuring that the common law is perceived as being outwardly 
legitimate, Hunter demonstrates that these efforts do not automatically prevent or remedy the 
production of injustices produced by traditional approaches towards judicial decision-
making.16 Ultimately, diversifying the judiciary is essential in reducing experiences of unjust 
legal outcomes, however this must be in undertaken in conjunction with a number of additional 
initiatives.17 This is significant, as a growing global portfolio of evidence by feminist scholars 
and activists highlights a trend of ‘unjust’ and ‘wrong’ judicial decisions despite the slow 
increase in the number of women and BAME judges appointed to the judiciary in England and 
Wales.18  
The continued production of unjust legal decisions despite an increase in diversity 
within the judiciary highlights the failure to properly address the lack of judicial diversity and 
to repair the inadequacies at the core of traditional judicial decision-making.19 Not only are 
efforts to re-dress the injustices produced at the root of the judicial decision-making process 
seemingly non-existent, but scholars indicate that the judiciary actively avoid discussing the 
process of judging openly and honestly with their peers or larger audiences.20 Worse still, as 
the traditional manner of judicial decision-making is so engrained there is increasing resistance 
directed towards potential fresh approaches. 21 Thus, in light of these multi-layered issues 
Posner highlights the study of judging as being ‘challenging [yet] indispensable’.22 
                                                        
15 Justice, ‘Increasing Judicial Diversity’ (Justice, April 2017) Executive Summary, 1, 20 
16 Rosemary Hunter, ‘More than Just a Different Face? Judicial Diversity and Decision-making’ [2015] Current Legal Problems 22-23 
17 Ibid 
18 There are Feminist Judgments Projects within Canada, England and Wales, Scotland, Northern Ireland, Australia, USA, India, New Zealand, 
and Africa.; Rosemary Hunter, ‘The Power of Feminist Judgments’ (2012) 20 Feminist Legal Studies 137; Lord Chief Justice of England and 
Wales and Senior President of Tribunals, ‘Judicial Diversity Statistics 2018’ (Lord Chief Justice of England and Wales and Senior President 
of Tribunals, 2018) 1;Lord Chief Justice of England and Wales and Senior President of Tribunals, ‘Judicial Diversity Statistics 2019’ (Lord 
Chief Justice of England and Wales and Senior President of Tribunals, 2019) 1  
19 Rosemary Hunter, ‘The Power of Feminist Judgments’ (2012) 20 Feminist Legal Studies 137 
20 Richard A Posner, How Judges Think (HUP, 2010) P 6 
21 Sharon Elizabeth Rush, ‘Feminist Judging: An Introductory Essay’ (1993) 2South California Review of Law and Women’s Studies 613 
22 Richard A Posner, How Judges Think (HUP, 2010) P 6 
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However, rather than studying, re-examining, critically appraising, and remodelling 
their existing approaches towards judicial decision-making in response to the injustices 
highlighted by feminist scholars, the judiciary in England and Wales prefers to ‘fetishize’ the 
rich history of the common law.23 In simply romanticising its history, the judiciary merely 
maintains its traditional approach to judicial decision-making.24 The idealisation of traditional 
judicial approaches facilitates the privileging of sameness and the culture of hostility towards 
the notion of difference at the heart of the judicial ideology.25 Similarly, the opposition towards 
difference is cemented by the treatment of judges who hold feminist beliefs and opinions by 
the media and the wider public. 
 Inevitably, in merely maintaining the judicial decision-making status quo with little to 
no modification, the various injustices identified by feminist scholars as existing within judicial 
decisions remain unchallenged and are perpetuated.26 Fundamentally, this means that women 
and other marginalised groups are left exposed to additional experiences of injustice by an 
institution purporting to be bound by the Rule of Law and thus subjecting all in society to the 
law equally. 27 Therefore, the impact of the judiciary’s failure to respond critically to the 
findings by feminist scholars and activists regarding the disproportionate level of injustice 
faced by women within original judicial decisions is two-fold: 1) women’s lives, experiences, 
and best interests are relegated to the secondary division by an institution purporting to equally 
serve all people 2) Arguably, in subordinating lay women’s life experiences within judicial 
                                                        
23 Hunter, Rosemary, ‘Contesting the dominant paradigm: Feminist critiques of liberal legalism’ in, Professor Margaret Davies and Professor 
Vanessa E Munro, The Ashgate research companion to feminist legal theory (Ashgate, 2013)  
Leslie J Moran, ‘Reviewed Work: Feminist Judgments: From Theory to Practice by Rosemary Hunter, Claire McGlynn, Erica Rackley’ 
(2012) 75 The Modern Law Review 287 
24 Hunter, Rosemary, ‘Contesting the dominant paradigm: Feminist critiques of liberal legalism’ in, Professor Margaret Davies and Professor 
Vanessa E Munro, The Ashgate research companion to feminist legal theory (Ashgate, 2013); Leslie J Moran, ‘Reviewed Work: Feminist 
Judgments: From Theory to Practice by Rosemary Hunter, Claire McGlynn, Erica Rackley’ (2012) 75 The Modern Law Review 287 
25 Rosemary Hunter, ‘More than Just a Different Face? Judicial Diversity and Decision-making’ (2015) 68 Current Legal Problems 127 
26 Carol Smart, Feminism and the Power of Law (Routledge, 2002) P 5; John Dewey, ‘Logical Method and Law’ [1924] The Cornell Law 
Quarterly 26 
27 Tom Bingham, The Rule of Law (Penguin, 2011) Ch 1; A V Dicey, Introduction to the Study of the Law of The Constitution (MacMillan 
and Co Ltd, 1962) P 193 ‘no man is above the law… that here every man, whatever be his rank or condition, is subject to the ordinary aw of 
the realm’. 
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decisions, the judiciary relinquishes the very legitimacy it seeks to uphold by appointing a more 
diverse judiciary. 
The failure by the judiciary to critically appraise the legitimacy of its existing approach 
towards judicial decision-making continues despite their collective awareness of the distinct 
experiences of women as ‘victims, witnesses, and offenders’ within the legal system.28 The 
reluctance to re-evaluate its existing approach towards judicial decision-making remains even 
when the ‘Equal Treatment Bench Books’ explicitly demonstrate that the judiciary have the 
capacity to ensure that women’s distinct experiences are recognised, addressed, and ‘protected’ 
to some degree.29 Legal realists also reinforce the considerable flexibility available to judges 
to reach socially just conclusions within their judicial decisions.30 Although the judiciary are 
in the position to protect and safeguard women from the unique disadvantages that they face 
within the judicial decision-making process, the majority of judges not only fail to capitalise 
on this potential, but they also deny the existence of this opportunity to protect women at the 
first instance.31 This dissertation demonstrates that the judiciary’s failure to recognise and act 
upon their capacity to respond effectively to the distinct experiences of women has resulted in 
what the Women’s Court Canada (WCC) has termed ‘a grievous judicial backsliding on 
equality’ in England and Wales.32 
The judiciary prioritises maintaining its existing approach towards judicial decision-
making or in other words they privilege the ‘niceties of its internal structure and the beauty of 
its logical processes’ above constructing a more specific approach to safeguard and protect 
women’s interests.33 This is despite research reinforcing that the legitimacy of the judicial 
system is not a) undermined by the incorporation of feminist belief or b) conditional upon                                                         
28 Judicial Studies Board, Equal Treatment Bench Book (Judicial Studies Board, September 2008) 6-1 
29 Ibid 
See also: Rosemary Hunter, ‘Feminist Judgments and Feminist Judging: Feminist Justice?’ (Feminist Justice Symposium, University of Ulster, 
June 2010) 14 
30 Hanoch Dagan, ‘The Realist Conception of Law’ (2007) 57 University of Toronto Law Journal 613  
31 Rosemary Hunter, Claire McGlynn, Erica Rackley, Feminist Judgments From Theory to Practice (Hart Publishing Ltd, 2010) P 9 
32 Diana Majury, ‘Introducing the Women’s Court of Canada’ (2006) 18 Canadian Journal of Women and the Law 1 
33 Roscoe Pound, ‘Mechanical Jurisprudence’ Columbia Law Review (1908) 8 605 
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absolute unanimity.34 In essence, the legitimacy of the judicial decision-making process lies in 
a fluid and varied approach which celebrates difference, rather than an absolutely unified and 
identical approach. Conversely, the integrity of the judicial decision-making process is 
‘safeguarded’ through dissenting and divergent approaches, as these differences require that 
judges and courts reflect upon the implications of their decisions and justify the rationale 
behind their decisions more rigorously.35 These challenges to the traditional judicial approach 
are said to generate a higher degree of rigour, or in other words an improved quality of judicial 
decision.36 This is precisely the aim sought by the JAC in their appointment of a more diverse 
judiciary.37 
 However, while practitioner guides, legal realists, and feminist legal scholars reinforce 
that women’s interests may be authentically accommodated within the judiciary’s approach to 
decision-making without sacrificing the legitimacy or the value of the common law, it appears 
that the compulsion to preserve the prestigious status of the traditional judicial decision-making 
approach trumps these realities.38 Ultimately, in preserving its existing formalist approach, the 
judiciary eschew the plethora of injustices identified by feminist scholars and activists within 
the judicial decision-making process as being inevitable and constitutive elements of judicial 
decision-making rather than addressing the issues at the core of existing approaches to judicial 
decision-making.39 
1.2 The “Gap”  
Thus far, the predominant practical focus has been dedicated to ensuring that the 
outward legitimacy of the law is visibly upheld by supporting efforts to increase judicial 
                                                        
34 Rosemary Hunter, Clare McGlynn, and Erika Rackley, Feminist Judgments From Theory to Practice (Hart Pubishing, 2010) P 30 – 31; 
Claire L’Hereux-Dubé, ‘The Dissenting Voice of The Future’ (2000) 38 Osgoode Hall Law Journal 495 
35 Ibid 497 
36 William J Brennan Jr, ‘In the Defense of Dissents’ (1986) 37 The Hastings Law Journal 430 
37 Justice, ‘Increasing Judicial Diversity’ (Justice, April 2017) 5 
38William J Brennan Jr, ‘In the Defense of Dissents’ [1986] 37 The Hastings Law Journal 430 
39 Ibid 
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diversity.40 While the importance of ensuring judicial diversity remains undisputed, in their 
continued depiction of unjust and inequitable judicial decisions, the Feminist Judgments 
Projects highlight the need for greater receptiveness towards practical and academic efforts to 
improve the law’s internal legitimacy.41  
The Feminist Judgments Project is committed to ensuring the law’s holistic legitimacy 
by promoting a more diverse and different approach to judicial decision-making by re-writing 
key original judicial decisions from a selected feminist standpoint.42 Unlike traditional judicial 
decision-making approaches, the Feminist Judgments Project mirrors the legal realist 
conception of judgment writing, as the authors illuminate the considerable flexibility available 
to judges to reason differently because of the law’s innate indeterminacy. 43  The project 
illustrates the potential for original judicial decisions to be decided differently in order to 
generate fairer, just, and equitable results for individuals within the cases and for members of. 
wider society .44 Pioneers of the project undermine the supposedly fixed and inevitable nature 
of the common law by adopting a feminist, legal realist stance to re-centre the distinct concerns 
of women and other marginalised groups within judicial decision-making.45  
Although the Feminist Judgments Project provides a realistic re-imagination of how 
judicial decision-making may be performed in the future in order to generate true ‘equal justice 
for all’, these collective approaches continue to be side-lined as an ‘alternative’ to traditional 
judicial approaches.46 This dissertation argues that articulating the feminist judicial decision-
making approaches as ‘alternative’ unduly limits their scope and applicability within the ‘real                                                         
40 House of Lords Select Committee on the Constitution, Judicial Appointments: follow up (House of Lords, 7th Report of Session 2017–19, 
November 2017) 33; Courts and Tribunals Judiciary, Judicial Diversity Committee of the Judges’ Council – Report on Progress and Action 
Plan 2018 (Courts and Tribunals Judiciary, 2018); Professor Kate Malleson, ‘Judicial Diversity Initiative’ (Judicial Diversity Initiative, 2018) 
< https://judicialdiversityinitiative.org > 1st September 2018 
41 Rosemary Hunter, ‘More than Just a Different Face? Judicial Diversity and Decision-making’ (2015) 68 Current Legal Problems 140 - 141 
42 Rosemary Hunter, Clare McGlynn, and Erika Rackley, Feminist Judgments From Theory to Practice (Hart Publishing, 2010) P 6 
43 Rosemary Hunter, Clare McGlynn, and Erika Rackley, Feminist Judgments From Theory to Practice (Hart Publishing, 2010) P 5 
Hanoch Dagan, ‘The Realist Conception of Law’ (2007) 57 University of Toronto Law Journal 613 
44 Rosemary Hunter, Clare McGlynn, and Erika Rackley, Feminist Judgments From Theory to Practice (Hart Publishing, 2010) P 6, 9 
45 Rosemary Hunter, Clare McGlynn, and Erika Rackley, Feminist Judgments From Theory to Practice (Hart Publishing, 2010) P 5 
Hanoch Dagan, ‘The Realist Conception of Law’ (2007) 57 University of Toronto Law Journal 613 
46 Sally Jane Kenney, Gender and Justice: Why Women in the Judiciary Really Matter (Routledge, 2013) P 15; 
See: Rosemary Hunter, ‘The Feminist Judgments Project’ (UKSC Blog, 17th January 2010) < http://ukscblog.com/the-feminist-judgments-
project/> accessed September 1st 2018 
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world’ and confines them to alternative-dom forever.47 Given their diminishment of gender 
and social inequalities, the dissertation submits that confining the feminist judicial decision-
making approaches to mere ‘alternatives’ is unnecessary, illogical, and paradoxical to the aim 
of the judiciary to uphold the integrity and legitimacy of judicial decision-making.48  
 Therefore, in the hope of establishing feminist judicial decision-making as a mode of 
judicial best practice, this thesis seeks to address the following research question: To what 
extent does feminist judicial decision-making constitute a valuable and legitimate 
approach to judgment writing?49  In order to address this question, the dissertation will 
analyse the feminist re-judgment of R v Dhaliwal (R v D)50 contained within the England and 
Wales Feminist Judgments Project - Feminist Judgments From Theory to Practice. In 
undertaking an analysis of this judgment and commentary, the dissertation will highlight the 
issues arising from the rigid, formalist approaches of the judges in the original court and will 
and examine the value and legitimacy of feminist judicial decision-making in responding to 
these issues. Despite the fact that this text considers the legitimacy and value of feminist 
judicial decision-making, thus far there has been little attention dedicated to examining its 
legitimacy and value within the context of formalist and realist conceptions of judicial 
decision-making. Thus, the dissertation responds to the lacuna within the Feminist Judgments 
Project and makes an original contribution to the literature centring on Feminist Judgment 
Projects. 
1.3 The Significance 
The importance of critically appraising the legitimacy of the feminist judgment writing 
approach is heightened because of the increasing number re-judgments by feminist scholars 
                                                        
47 Ibid 
48 Claire L’Hereux-Dubé, ‘The Dissenting Voice of The Future’ (2000) 38 Osgoode Hall Law Journal 496 
49 Rosemary Hunter, Clare McGlynn, and Erika Rackley, Feminist Judgments From Theory to Practice (Hart Publishing, 2010) P 43 
50 R v D [2006] EWCA Crim 1139  
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and activists which highlight flaws in current judicial approaches globally.51 Fundamentally, 
feminist scholars reinforce that:  
 
 We need more feminist judges: judges who understand women’s experiences and take 
seriously harm to women and girls, who ask the gender question, ‘How might this law, 
statute, or holding affect men and women differently?; who value women’s lives and 
women’s work; who do not believe women to be liars, whores, or deserving of violence 
by nature; who question their own stereotypes and predilections and listen to evidence; 
and who, simply put, believe in equal justice for all.52 
 
Ultimately then, there is a pressing need to respond to the distinct experiences of 
women at various levels within the justice system, and the continued failure by the judiciary to 
uptake this opportunity.53 As traditional approaches towards judicial decision-making operate 
as the normative standard for judgment writing, a great deal of resistance towards the 
possibility of fresh approaches remains. 54  Therefore, a critical appraisal of the Feminist 
Judgment Project is pivotal in order to explore whether this approach to judgment writing 
constitutes a legitimate and valuable judicial decision-making avenue. In critically analysing 
the feminist judgments project methodology, it is hoped that the dissertation may uproot the 
normative conceptions of judicial decision-making, and in the process facilitate an opportunity 
for the imaginative and innovative approaches constructed by the Feminist Judgment Project 
to be utilised by scholars and practitioners as a mode of best practice. 
More broadly, the importance of undertaking a critical evaluation of the Feminist 
Judgments methodology is cemented by the need for England and Wales to honour their                                                         
51 Rosemary Hunter, ‘The Power of Feminist Judgments’ (2012) 20 Feminist Legal Studies 137 
52 Sally Jane Kenney, Gender and Justice: Why Women in the Judiciary Really Matter (Routledge 2013) P 15 
See also: Catherine A Mackinnon, Toward a Feminist Theory of the State (HUP, 1989) P 249  
53 Judicial Studies Board, Equal Treatment Bench Book (Judicial Studies Board, September 2008) 6-1 
54 Sharon Elizabeth Rush, ‘Feminist Judging: An Introductory Essay’ (1993) 2 Californian Review of Law and Women’s Studies 613 
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commitment to ending gender inequality and further women’s equality by 2030.55 The critical 
evaluation of feminist judicial decision-making is also vital ‘to avoid feminist alternative 
accounts becoming equally oppressive and constraining’ as the traditional approach in which 
the project seeks to depart.56 It is hoped that evaluating the legitimacy of feminist judicial 
decision-making will support Hunter’s desire for feminist judgment writing to be used more 
frequently within academia and within the judicial realm.57 
1.4 Chapter Outline 
This dissertation evaluates the value and legitimacy of the Feminist Judgments Project 
to explore if this feminist, realist method may operate as the mode of best practice for judicial 
decision-making in England and Wales. This chapter briefly outlines the background to and 
significance of the issue addressed by the dissertation and demonstrates the limited practical 
focus upon re-dressing the internal injustices created by the traditional judicial decision-
making approach. The chapter highlights the reluctance by the judiciary to deviate from the 
traditional, formalist approach to judgment writing. Simultaneously the dissertation highlights 
that while the Feminist Judgments Project outlays the potential impacts and value of feminist 
re-judgments, authors have not undertaken a specific analysis of these re-judgments in view of 
and with the aim of ingraining feminist judicial decision-making as the conventional approach 
towards judgment writing. 
 The following chapter provides an extended review of the literature centring upon 
judicial decision-making. The chapter undertakes a realist critique of formalist approaches 
towards judicial decision-making and identifies media pressure for the judiciary to conform to 
formalist judicial decision-making approaches. In considering the various flaws inherent within 
the formalist approach to judicial decision-making and the barriers that this approach seeks to                                                         
55 British Council, Gender Equality and Empowerment of Women and Girls in the UK (British Council, 2016) Foreword, 7 British Council, 
‘What are the SDGs?’ (British Council) <https://www.britishcouncil.org/sustainable-development-goals/what-are-they> last accessed 1st 
September 2018  
56 Rosemary Hunter, ‘The Power of Feminist Judgments’ (2012) 20 Feminist Legal Studies 145 
57 Rosemary Hunter, Clare McGlynn, and Erika Rackley, Feminist Judgments From Theory to Practice (Hart Pubishing, 2010) P 43 
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place between the judge and the social inequalities that they are invoked to adjudicate, the 
dissertation criticises the continued promotion of judgment writing in the traditional, formalist 
sense. It is pivotal to analyse the literature from these lenses to understand the present 
inadequate approach to judicial decision-making and the promise held by feminist judicial 
decision-making. 
The dissertation will then analyse the case R v Dhaliwal (R v D) from the Feminist 
Judgments Project with the support of these respective lenses.58 This analysis is undertaken to 
support the assessment of whether feminist judicial decision-making promotes fairness and 
fundamentally an ‘equal justice for all’.59 
The final chapter concludes by evaluating whether feminist judicial decision-making 
may legitimately operate as the mode of best judicial practice in England and Wales. This is 
achieved through a reflection upon the case analysis and the review of formalist, realist, and 
feminist legal scholarship. 
 
 
  
                                                        
58 R v D [2006] EWCA Crim 1139 
59 Ibid 
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Chapter 2 - Literature Review – An Analysis of Judicial Decision Writing: A Mirage of 
Logic, Objectivity and Impartiality and an Extension of Inequality 
 
‘Like other tools [rules] must be modified when they are applied to new conditions and new 
results have to be achieved. Here is where the great practical evil of the doctrine of immutable 
and necessary antecedent rules comes in. It sanctifies the old; adherence to it in practise 
constantly widens the gap between current social conditions and the principles used by the 
courts. The effect is to breed irritation, disrespect for law, together with virtual alliance 
between the judiciary and entrenched interests that correspond most nearly to the conditions 
under which the rules of law were previously laid down.’ 60 
 
2.1 Overview  
 A literature review is expressed as being integral to the structure of academic writing 
and paramount in the formation of new knowledge.61 There are many discussions about what 
constitutes an effective ‘literature review’ and its overarching purpose.62 However, generally 
scholars describe a literature review as being an exercise undertaken by the author who 
provides a summary, interpretation, and synthesis of the existing body of literature within and 
closely tied to the authors’ selected area of research.63 Its purpose is three-fold: to assist the 
reader in understanding the wider body of literature around the author’s chosen subject area, 
to enable the author to situate their personal research approach within the existing body of 
literature, and to enable the author to signify how their approach reflects and differs from 
existing research.64 Although this description may present a literature review as a jigsaw-like 
exercise in which the author is simply tasked with mechanically selecting pieces of the puzzle 
to slot into place in relation to the other pieces, scholars highlight the need for a more engaged 
                                                        
60 John Dewey, ‘Logical Method and Law’ (1924) 10 The Cornell Law Quarterly 26 
61 Paul Oliver, Succeeding With Your Literature Review: A Handbook For Students: A Handbook (McGraw-Hill Education, 2012) P 1  
62 See: Rowena Murray, How To Write A Thesis (McGraw-Hill Education, 2011) P 122 onwards; 
David N Boote and Penny N Beile, ‘Scholars Before Researchers: On the Centrality of the Dissertation Literature Review in Research 
Preparation’ (2005) 34 Educational Researcher 3 
63 Andrew S Denvey and Richard Tewksbury,  ‘How to Write a Literature Review’ (2013) 24 Journal of Criminal Justice Education 218 
64 Christine Susan Bruce, ‘Research students early experience of the dissertation literature review’ (1994) 19 Studies in Higher Education 217 
-218 
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and creative approach by the author within this exercise.65 Fundamentally, Murray highlights 
the active role played by the researcher in crafting and interpreting their own version of the 
existing body of literature.66  
Thus, this section seeks to provide a synthesised and interpretive review of the existing 
literature on judicial decision-making from the standpoints of legal formalism, legal realism, 
and feminist jurisprudence. Beginning an analysis of judicial decision-making from the 
perspective of legal formalism may appear to be counter-productive within a dissertation that 
seeks to persuade a shift away from more archaic and rigid approaches towards judicial 
decision-making in favour of a more fluid approach.67 However, providing an interpretation of 
the key themes and ideas developed through formalist conceptions of judicial decision-making 
is paramount in order to trouble dominant formalist conceptions of judicial decision-making, 
to identify the flaws and inadequacies with the existing formalist approach to judicial decision-
making, and to illuminate the possibility for judicial decision-making to be remoulded in order 
to increase its value and legitimacy without sacrificing its integrity as ‘law’.68 In other words 
the analysis of judicial decision-making from the perspective of legal formalism and legal 
realism is pivotal as a deconstructive exercise to assist the ‘other’ in this case, feminist judicial 
decision-making in becoming the judicial mode of best practice.69  
This review will illuminate the multiple falsehoods promoted by formalist approaches 
towards judicial decision-making and the damaging impact of encouraging these formalist 
approaches in practice, particularly in terms of the perceived legitimacy and value of the 
common law.70 In doing so, the analysis will highlight both the opportunity and the need to 
rescue judicial decision-making from being delegitimised by society in light of its production                                                         
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of ‘unjust’ legal decisions.71 Deconstructing judicial decision-making in this way demonstrates 
the emancipatory promise held by feminist judicial decision-making, as a tool to further social 
equality and to ensure the production of just and legitimate legal decisions. Ultimately this 
literature review aims to convey the existing approaches to judicial decision-making as a 
mirage of logic, objectivity, and impartiality. Finally, the literature review highlights the 
potential for feminist judicial decision-making as a realist approach to redress the injustices 
and inequalities produced by formalist approaches towards judicial decision-making.  
2.2 Judicial Decision-Making as Pure ‘Logic’? 
Legal formalists express the common law as being constructed by judges who perform 
judicial decision-making in a purely ‘mechanical’, ‘prescriptive’, and ‘rigorously structured 
doctrinal[ly] scientific’ manner.72 Formalists argue that judges undertake judicial decision-
making in a very strict manner because they perceive the legitimacy of the common law as 
being dependent on the pure application of legal logic and rules within an autonomous legal 
world.73 Articulating the production of common law decisions as reliant solely upon the narrow 
and mechanical application of legal logic suggests that judges must undergo a systematic, 
highly restrictive, inductive, and contained application of legal rules to complex and different 
cases in order for the common law to retain its legitimacy.74 In other words, all cases, without 
taking into account their complexity and varying facts and demands, should be decided by 
applying the same rigid, mechanical approach to judicial decision-making. 
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In recent years the seeming departure from strict formalist conceptions of judicial 
decision-making as a strictly rule-based exercise has provoked distrust towards judges and the 
common law more broadly. The level of distrust directed towards judges who are seen as 
deviating from the formalist conception of judicial decision-making is effectively highlighted 
within recent media coverage centring on the role and ambit of judicial decision-makers in the 
UK. Indeed, President of the UK Supreme Court, Baroness Hale of Richmond has been 
described as an ‘Enem[y] of the People’, ‘A Radical feminist who is a long-running critic of 
marriage’, ‘A hardline feminist’, ‘The judge happy for law to be seen as an ass’, and  ‘Out of 
touch’ by the media.75 These descriptions depict Hale and judges collectively who openly 
identify as ‘feminist’ as dubious, and as committed to making a mockery of the legal system 
in England and Wales. 76  Ultimately, these perceptions are borne out of formalist 
misconceptions of judicial decision-making as a solely rule-based exercise. By openly drawing 
upon feminist beliefs when writing judgments, these feminist judges are seen as violating 
formalist conceptions of judgment making as an ‘impartial application of determinate existing 
rules of law in the settlement of disputes’.77 
These media sources indicate that mainstream conceptions of judicial decision-making 
are informed by core tenets of legal formalism, as these sources dismiss and discredit judges 
who openly hold and reflect upon personal beliefs within their judgment writing as 
untrustworthy and as undermining the legitimacy of the common law. 78 Ultimately these 
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headlines echo formalist views that judges should be completely autonomous and that they 
must deny their feminist beliefs so that they can simply perform their job: to apply the law.79  
However, this is an unrealistic and reductive depiction of the role of the judge which 
diminishes the uniquely complex interpretation and navigation involved in judicial decision-
making. Legal realists demonstrate that judicial decision-makers are not simply tasked with 
‘applying the law’, their role requires that judges go beyond the realms of simply applying 
legal logic.80 Indeed, although the formalist image of judicial decision-making as a systematic 
and mechanical application of legal logic may appeal to some due to the seeming ease with 
which legal problems may be resolved or ‘pigeonholed’, legal realists demonstrate that 
positioning judicial decision-making as a purely logical exercise is ‘deceptively simple’.81 This 
is because these formalist approaches deny the judge’s active role within the ‘complex 
interaction between rules and facts’, a relationship that necessitates judges to go beyond simply 
applying legal logic and instead calls upon judges to actively reshape case facts to correspond 
each legal situation with the most fitting legal rule.82 Despite attempts by formalists to present 
judicial decision-making as mechanical, realists expose the reality that no legal system can 
‘signify rules so rigid that they can be stated once for all and then be literally and mechanically 
adhered to’.83 Ultimately, the judge will always be called upon to do more than simply apply 
legal logic because legal rules are to some degree indeterminate.84 
Arguably, the projection of judicial decision-making as an endeavour involving the 
pure sole application of legal rules to cases fuels the fictitious image of judges as being passive 
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in their creation of law.85 Indeed, Rackley articulates that the presentation of judicial decision-
making as involving a pure application of logic illustrates judges as acting somewhere between 
a ‘demigod’ and a ‘legal pharmacist, dispensing the correct rule prescribed for the legal 
problem presented.’86 In other words, the formalist lens through which judges are often viewed 
facilitates the image of a far-removed judge who simply applies legal rules in isolation. 
Llewellyn firmly refutes any attempt to demonstrate judicial decision writers as passive, 
instead evidencing lawmakers’ instrumentality in the production of law. 87  Judge Posner 
develops this important argument, as he holds that judicial decision-makers are actually 
complicit in the continued pretence of judicial decision writing existing as a purely autonomous 
exercise supported by esoteric resources.88  
Despite the rejection of this inaccurate portrayal of judging by many scholars, Rackley 
asserts that our perceptions of effective and efficient judgment writing remains bound to these 
prevailing conceptions of judgment writing.89 Thus, at this stage it is important to state that an 
authentic account of judicial decision-making reflects a complex, indeterminate process 
requiring the judge to select between a multiplicity of legal rules to be applied within difficult 
legal issues.90 The sheer multiplicity of legal rules available for selection by the judge within 
any given case creates ambiguity, which then necessitates for the judge to draw upon more than 
legal logic to construct their decisions.91 
                                                        
85 Margot Stubbs, ‘Feminism and Legal Positivism’ (1986) 3 Australian Journal of Law and Society 63; Leslie Green, ‘Harts Message’ in 
HLA Hart The Concept of Law (OUP Oxford, 2012) P 15; Sir William Blackstone, Blackstone's Commentaries Part 1 Book 1 (1803) P 41 
86 Erika Rackley, Women, Judging and the Judiciary: From Difference to Diversity (Routledge, 2013) P 130; William Brennan, ‘Reason, 
Passion, and the Progress of the Law’ [1998] Cardazo Law Review 4  
87 Karl Llewellyn, The Bramble Bush: On Our Law and Its Study. (Quid Pro Books, 2012) P 38 
‘the judge has sifted through these ‘facts’ again, and picked a few which he puts forward as essential - and whose legal bearing he then 
proceeds to expound’.  
88 Richard A Posner, How Judges Think (Harvard University Press, 2008) P 3 
89Duncan Kennedy, A Critique of Adjudication (HUP, 1992) P 192; Erika Rackley, Women, Judging and the Judiciary: From Difference to 
Diversity (Routledge, 2013) P 135 
90 Karl Llewellyn, The Bramble Bush: On Our Law and Its Study. (Quid Pro Books, 2012) P 40 – 48; 
Karl Llewellyn, ‘The Case Law System in America’ (1988) 88 Columbia Law Review 990,995; Hanoch Dagan, ‘The Realist Conception of 
Law’ (2007) 57 University of Toronto Law Journal 611; Erika Rackley, ‘How feminism could improve judicial decision-making’ The 
Guardian (11th November 2010) <https://www.theguardian.com/law/2010/nov/11/feminism-improve-judicial-decision-making> accessed 
February 2018  
91 Hanoch Dagan, ‘The Realist Conception of Law’ (2007) 57 University of Toronto Law Journal 611-617 
  
21 
21 
Ultimately, the formalist conception of judicial decision-making as pure ‘logic’ 
presents judicial decision writing as providing what Marx terms an ‘unreal universality.’92 In 
other words, formalist conceptions of law produce the false impression that the application of 
legal rules by judicial decision writers is undertaken in a pure and removed manner; in a way 
that disqualifies bias towards individual characteristics or idiosyncrasies, and instead privileges 
a supposedly ‘neutral’ and ‘universal response’. 93  Stubbs cautions against this wholly 
unrealistic illustration of law.94 While the aesthetic of judicial decision writing as a mechanical, 
syllogistic, and systematic application of rules by decision makers to legal issues may appeal 
to some because the appearance of absolute consistency and uniformity, ultimately this is 
antithetical to the authentic account of judging as detailed above.95 
Legal Realist, Benjamin Cardozo emphasises the need to depart from the untruth of 
treating judicial decision-making as solely logic-based exercise in the interests of upholding 
the legitimacy of the common law. Indeed, he emphasises that the judicial decision-making 
process must be approached as ‘the end which the law serves, and fitting its rules to the task at 
service.’96 In other words, in the interests of fairness, rules cannot and ought not be simply 
‘applied’ to legal cases because the complex nature of judicial decision-making necessitates a 
more intuitive, considered approach by judges towards each case. 97 This is paramount to 
recognise because the 'final cause of law is the welfare of society' and in attempting to treat 
legal cases as mere scientific issues with a correct and incorrect outcome, judges actively 
neglect the very real social inequalities and welfare issues faced by those seeking legal 
redress.98 Scholars emphasise that formalist conceptions of law enforce a barrier between the 
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common law and ‘social goals and human values’.99 In essence, because formalists perceive 
legal rules as being ‘determinate’ and thus infallible, judges are isolated from, and are actively 
barred from engaging with, the social inequalities that they adjudicate beyond a strictly rule-
based application of the law. 100 Thus, the privileging of formalist conceptions of judicial 
decision-making is particularly alarming considering that the perceived legitimacy of the 
common law is not only derived from ‘just’ judicial decision-making, but also from the public’s 
perceptions as to how ‘in touch’ the judge appears to be with wider social issues faced by 
individuals before the court.101 In short, if the judge is not perceived as being ‘in touch’ with 
these issues by the wider public, the legitimacy and value of judicial decision-making and the 
law more widely is threatened.102  
Therefore, in seeking to maintain judicial decision-making in the formalist sense as a 
pure application of legal logic, the media and the judiciary actively neglect the complexity of 
judicial decision-making, overly simplify the judicial decision-making process, construct 
barriers around social inequalities within wider society, and present a romanticized, fabricated 
image of judicial decision-making. The consistent idealisation of formalist approaches is 
reflected in the public sphere, where media criticism of realist and feminist judges accuses 
these members of the judiciary of threatening the very fabric of the law and society itself. 
However, the formalist approach itself leads to a separation between the law and contemporary 
societal issues, which in itself exacerbates the popularity of the formalist approach.  
2.3 Judicial Decision-Making as Determinate? 
  As noted above, the rejection of the reductionist conception of judicial decision-making 
as a purely logic-based exercise is at the heart of the legal realist critique of judicial decision-
making.103 This is because legal realists perceive that the ‘indeterminacy’ of legal doctrine                                                         
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‘renders pure doctrinalism a conceptual impossibility’. 104  They perceive that the sheer 
multiplicity and manipulability of legal rules in any given legal case creates ambiguity and this 
necessitates that judges draw upon more than legal logic in order to: a) make a decision between 
two or more competing legal rules, or to b) fit legal facts to these legal rules in any judicial 
decision.105 Ultimately, they recognise the multiple factors at play in judicial decision-making 
because of the law’s inherent indeterminacy unlike the legal formalists who maintain the 
superlative role played by legal logic.106  
However, Hart asserts that the realist argument regarding the indeterminacy of law is 
overstated because there are ‘plain cases constantly recurring in similar contexts to which 
general expressions are clearly applicable’.107 While realists concede that some cases will 
involve a less complex decision-making process, and that the nature of legal doctrine 
‘impose[s] certain limitations in the [court’s] application’ they maintain that ‘a gap will always 
exist between doctrinal materials and judicial outcomes.’ 108  Thus, realists hold that the 
ambiguity generated by the law’s indeterminacy not only facilitates, but requires judges to 
make personal choices which are informed beyond the realms of legal logic in order ‘to 
reformulate the victorious trend, more narrowly or broadly than espoused by the attorney.’109 
Fundamentally, the indeterminacy generated by the multiplicity of legal rules available to the 
judge combined with the considerable discretion extended to judicial decision-makers when 
constructing their final decisions necessitates that they draw upon multiple factors to assist in 
their choice between legal rules.110 These factors may include but are not limited to: ‘life 
experience, educational and professional background, personal beliefs, and the social                                                         
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context’.111 That is not to say that we venture into a ‘Frankified’ version of judicial decision-
making whereby the judge has unfettered discretion to reach the conclusion that most aptly 
reflects their personal beliefs, instead we merely recognise the reciprocity between the 
indeterminacy of legal doctrine and the discretion possessed by judges to fill the gap created 
by this doctrinal indeterminacy.112 
The active involvement of a judge’s personal beliefs, background, and values when 
authoring their judicial decisions runs counter to formalist and more generalised accounts of 
judicial decision writing as absolutely ‘impersonal [and] objective’. 113  Indeed, Llewellyn 
illustrates the perceived dichotomy between the reality of judicial decision-making as being 
informed by human life experiences and its clash with the illusion of judges providing ‘absolute 
certainty’.114 Although Llewellyn demonstrates the need to balance various human and legal 
factors when constructing legal judgments, some continue to be motivated by reductive, 
formalist perspectives which attempt to strictly separate and polarise these factors.115 
For example, some scholars criticise the inclusion of feminist beliefs within judgment 
writing, as they assert that ‘feminism in a judge is… evidence of partiality [and] a threat to 
judicial independence.’116 However, Hunter refutes the suggestion that the inclusion of judges’ 
feminist principles damages or conflicts with the production of approved judicial decision 
writing.117 Instead she demonstrates that they represent a springboard by which to inform rather 
than to prejudice legal judgments.118 Thus, in demonstrating the important role played by 
judges’ discretion and personal values within the judicial decision-making process, the 
                                                        
111 Bridget J. Crawford, ‘Feminist Judging Matters: How Feminist Theory and Methods Affect the Process of Judgment’ University of 
Baltimore Law Review [2018] 186; Rosemary Hunter, Clare McGlynn, and Erika Rackley, Feminist Judgments From Theory to Practice 
(Hart Publishing, 2010) P 5, 31 
112 Brian Leiter, ‘Toward a Naturalized Jurisprudence’ (1997) 76 Texas Law Review 269  
113 John Dewey, ‘Logical Method and Law’ (1924) 10 The Cornell Law Quarterly 24 
114 Karl Llewellyn, ‘The Case Law System in America’ (1988) 88 Columbia Law Review 995 
115 Joseph Bingham, ‘What is Law? Part II’ [1912] Michigan Law Review 113; Brian Tamanaha, ‘Understanding Legal Realism’ (2009) 87 
Texas Law Review 732 
116 Wendy Baker, ‘Women’s Diversity: Legal Practice and Legal Education – A View from the Bench’ (1996) 45 University of New Brunswick 
Law Journal 199 
117 Rosemary Hunter, Clare McGlynn, and Erika Rackley, Feminist Judgments From Theory to Practice (Hart Publishing, 2010) P 31, 43 
118 Ibid 
  
25 
25 
respective realist and feminist approaches expose the false dichotomy between the application 
legal logic and the incorporation of these values. In so doing, they also undermine dominant 
formalist conceptions of judicial decision-making which aim to problematise the inclusion of 
any other factors outside legal logic.  
2.4 Judicial Decision-Making: Legal Realism as ‘fundamentalist’ 
 Despite the provision of a more authentic and nuanced account of judgment writing by 
legal realists, prominent scholars such as HLA Hart and Lind characterise the respective realist 
and formalist schools of thought as extremist.119 Thus, they prefer to adopt what they term a 
midway approach between embracing logical legal reasoning and recognising the limits of 
logic. 120  However, this is precisely the balance struck by legal realism indicating 
misconceptions of legal realism. 121  In articulating legal realism as fundamentalist, these 
scholars do a disservice to realism by illuminating realist conceptions as potentially dangerous 
and harmful.122 Not only do they provide an inaccurate account of realism, but arguably in 
doing so they also limit the opportunities for realist conceptions of law to be considered as 
legitimate legal approaches. Thus, in illustrating realist conceptions of law as being extremist 
the shrouding of law and judicial decision writing behind the indestructible shields of 
‘objectivity’ is permitted to continue. Subsequently, this supports a double-denial: firstly, a 
denial of the reality of law and a denial of judicial decision writing as being partisan and as 
facilitating inequality in practice. 123  This then denies the potential for legal realist re-
conceptions of these tools, which demonstrate what lawmakers ‘ought’ to do to be considered 
as legitimate.124  
The denial resulting from the inaccurate portrayals of legal realism is particularly 
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important to recognise, as Fuller depicts the implications arising from the continued distortion 
of the reality of law. 125  Ultimately, scholars warn that these misrepresentations become 
ingrained as reality. 126  However, despite concerns regarding the protraction of formalist 
conceptions of judicial decision-making, some scholars identify resentment to a challenge to 
the prevailing formalist image of judicial method.127   
2.5 Judicial Decision-Making as Male: The Myth of ‘Objectivity’  
While legal formalists are concerned with maintaining the image of judicial decision-
making as an autonomous and objective logical exercise, in comparison, realist and feminist 
legal scholars uncover that this very quest results in the subjectivity and subsequent unfairness 
inherent within traditional judicial decision-making. Although legal formalists characterise 
traditional judicial decision writing by its supposedly pure, objective and autonomous nature, 
feminist scholars mirror legal realists in that they uncover the falsity of this image. 128 
Mackinnon illuminates the manipulation of the value of ‘objectivity’ in its pure form by the 
judiciary as a means of privileging the voices of men and marginalising women’s 
experiences.129 She demonstrates that ‘objectivity’ in its distorted sense is then established as 
the universal standard under which the law, the judiciary, and society operate.130 Inevitably, 
this means that in maintaining the existing approach to judicial decision-making, judges will 
subconsciously or otherwise inclined to prioritise the interests of men above women in legal 
cases.131 
Ultimately, MacKinnon demonstrates that the marginalisation of women’s experiences 
by the law is permitted because the values of neutrality and objectivity are synonymous with 
                                                        
125 Lon Fuller, ‘Positivism and Fidelity to Law-A Reply to Professor Hart’ (1958) 71 Harvard Law Review 631 
126 Ibid 
127 Ibid 631, 632 
128  Richard H Pildes, ‘Forms of Formalism’ (1999) 66 The University of Chicago Law Review 608, 609; Emily Jackson, ‘Catherine 
MacKinnon and Feminist Jurisprudence: A Critical Appraisal’ (1992) 19 Journal of Law and Society 195 
129 Catherine A MacKinnon, Toward a Feminist Theory of the State (Harvard University Press, 1989) P 114  
130 Catherine A MacKinnon, Toward a Feminist Theory of the State (Harvard University Press, 1989) P 237 
131 Ibid 
  
27 
27 
maleness.132The law’s role in the distortion of these values in their pure form is invisible 
because male perspectives dominate within wider society and are reinforced by the judiciary 
within the common law. 133  Thus, the manipulation of these values goes largely unquestioned. 
Instead, judicial decision-makers and the common law more broadly is commended for its 
retention of this distorted value of objectivity.134 In essence, law is routinely commended for 
its gendered and sexist approaches towards women under the guise of ‘objectivity’.  
In upholding the sham of absolute ‘judicial objectivity’, MacKinnon expresses the 
proclivity of the law to exclude marginalised social groups. Simultaneously, she uncovers the 
lip service paid to the value of objectivity by the judiciary in practice. 135 Therefore, although 
the notion that ‘subjective decision-making based on political or social or philosophical beliefs 
leads to unpredictable and arbitrary results’ is true, the current traditional judicial approach 
reflects these sentiments because these traditional approaches are weighted heavily in favour 
of men’s interests.136  
In light of the common law’s consistent privileging of male interests under the 
guise of objectivity, Mackinnon cements the need for a distinctly feminist legal approach. 
In doing so she indirectly highlights the promise held by the Feminist Judgments Project 
as an imaginative and promising feminist legal method that engages with real world 
judgment writing.137 She argues that:  
 
Women have never consented to [law’s] rule – suggesting that the system’s  
legitimacy needs repair that women are in a position to provide.  It will be said  
that feminist law cannot win and will not work. But this is premature. Its  
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possibilities cannot be assessed in the abstract but must engage with the world.  
A feminist theory of the state has barely been imagined; systematically, it has  
never been tried.138 
 
This dissertation argues that the Feminist Judgments Project responds to the production 
of gendered judicial decisions and offers a viable opportunity for change.139 The Feminist 
Judgments Project is a hybrid feminist-legal methodological approach requiring activists and 
scholars to undertake feminist re-judgments of unjust, inequitable, troubling cases that are 
pertinent to feminist legal scholarship.140  The method requires that scholars select important 
cases that they feel would benefit from feminist analysis.141 The feminist re-analysis must be 
undertaken in line with existing judgment writing conventions and constraints such as the 
judicial oath.142 In constructing the judgments, scholars are not confined to a set feminist 
approach to reflect the fluid and expansive nature of feminism.  However, Hunter also 
highlights the key techniques shared by all of the judgments contained within the collection; 
including ‘asking the woman question’, ‘seeking to remedy injustices and to improve the 
conditions of women’s lives’, ‘promoting substantive equality’ ‘story-telling’ and a reliance 
on contextual materials.143  
Despite their collective adherence to the judicial oath and conventions, suspicion 
towards the open and active inclusion of feminist perspectives within judicial decision-making 
continues. Lord Bingham of Cornhill emphasises that judicial decisions must be ‘legally 
motivated’ meaning that decisions are to be generated from a consultation with established 
legal doctrine or common law principles rather than from the assistance of untruthful legal 
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means.144 Within his keynote address, Bingham characterises judicial decisions which are 
written in view of factors other than common law principles or doctrinal sources as being 
inauthentic legal decisions.145 Arguably, in illustrating judicial decision writing in this narrow 
way, Bingham underlines the need for judicial decisions to be written in isolation of all other 
influences in order to retain their status as legitimate legal decision.146 
 Despite efforts to present judges who openly draw upon external influences as part of 
their decisions as being somehow unfaithful to the true judicial role, other commentators work 
to normalise this as part of the process.147 Lord Justice Etherton exposes the reality of judicial 
decision writing in practice and simultaneously expresses the impossibility for a complete 
divorce between judicial decisions and the personal bias and life experiences of judges.148 As 
such, Etherton undermines the image of the judge exercising a totally unfettered and 
unharnessed discretion, and instead demonstrates a careful and holistic consideration by 
judicial decision makers to author just and fair decisions for parties.149 Arguably, Baroness 
Hale of Richmond advances Etherton’s argument by asserting that the creation of judicial 
decisions and deeply held personal beliefs are not incompatible with one another.150 Rather, 
the beliefs and life experiences of judges actively inform the judicial decision writing process 
and these personal beliefs support the invention of what will eventually come to be known as 
“the law”.151  
Indeed, Rackley reflects upon the opposition towards the inclusion of feminist values 
within legal judgment writing.152 She asks the fundamental question: ‘given that judges will, 
sometimes, have no choice but to fall back on their own values and perspectives, why shouldn't 
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feminist values and perspectives be included?’153 Indeed, the media headlines and formalists 
treat the presence of feminism within judgment writing with contempt in comparison to the 
plethora of other beliefs that may also be invoked by judges when authoring their judgment.154 
‘The Secret Barrister’ strengthens Rackley’s challenge to the issue with the invocation of 
feminist values as they ask ‘all lawyers are members of legal societies. I'm a member of 
Criminal Bar Association - should that stop me being a crim[inal] judge?’155 Ultimately, both 
questions directly challenge the mainstream resistance towards the incorporation of personal 
beliefs and biases within judicial decision-making. Moreover, the strong opposition towards 
the reflection upon feminist beliefs within judicial decision-making raises the question: what 
makes feminist beliefs distinct from all other beliefs so as to justify the treatment of these 
values with such arbitrary suspicion? 
Similarly, the treatment of feminist views within the traditional judicial decision writing 
process as being suspicious or devious is reflected across the globe in Australia, as the Sydney 
Morning Herald reported on a ‘female judge [who was] asked to disqualify herself due to 
suspected “feminist” and “leftist” views.’156 The justice was asked to step down by her male 
colleague on the basis that he ‘suspected that as a female judge, I was a feminist with leftist 
leanings, who would not give him a fair hearing’. 157 Regardless of the judges’ personal views, 
the sub-text of this accusation is that (1) judges holding feminist views cannot be trusted to 
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perform their job without bias and (2) by default judges who identify as women decide cases 
in line with feminist principles.158  
Firstly, these various instances reflect a double standard in relation to the specific 
incorporation of feminist beliefs as opposed to other beliefs. Secondly, while a judges’ gender 
may influence the way that they judge, Somiline et al underline the problematic and inaccurate 
assumption that women judges will instinctively undertake a feminist approach to judgment 
writing.159 Ultimately, while in England and Wales ‘nemo iudex in causa sua’ and ‘justice must 
not only be done but be seen to be done’, Hunter demonstrates that invoking feminist beliefs 
within judgment making does not conflict with these principles and the need to uphold judicial 
impartiality.160 Rather, Hunter underlines the Feminist Judgments Project as representing an 
ideal fusion between feminism and legal principles, both of which are fluid and unfixed to 
some degree and also assist in the construction of variable and indeterminate outcomes.161  
The irony inherent within the notion that judges who hold or reflect upon feminist 
beliefs are in some way prejudiced is effectively encapsulated by MacKinnon in her text in 
Towards a Feminist Theory of the State. She hypothesizes about the critical reception of 
feminist law operating in practice:  
 
 To the extent feminist law embodies women’s point of view, it will be said  
that its law is not neutral. But existing law is not neutral. It will be said that it 
undermines the legitimacy of the legal system. But the legitimacy of existing law is 
based on force at women’s expense.162  
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 This passage reaffirms the double standard applied to feminist approaches in comparison to 
the current ‘objective’ or more aptly, male approach, as she demonstrates that maleness 
continues to be accepted as the objective and correct mode of operation.163 
Conversely, the law’s insistence upon maintaining its pretence of absolute objectivity 
and impartiality within judicial decision writing results in the perpetuation of the very 
inequalities that decision writers seek to distance themselves from. 164  Indeed, Dewey 
demonstrates that in portraying and attempting to engrain judicial decision writing as 
syllogistic and mechanical scholars further entrench inequality, as ‘adherence to it in practise 
constantly widens the gap between current social conditions and the principles used by the 
courts.’165Dewey argues that adhering to formalist conceptions of judicial decision-making to 
inspires ‘irritation, disrespect for law, together with virtual alliance between the judiciary and 
entrenched interests that correspond most nearly to the conditions under which the rules of law 
were previously laid down.’166 Ironically then, continuing the pretence of judicial decision-
making as an autonomous, purely impartial, and objective process appears to damage the 
reputation, legitimacy and aesthetic of the common law. 167  Not only does the continued 
portrayal of judicial decision-making in formalist terms damage the reputation of the common 
law, but as Dewey demonstrates it also extends greater distance between the judiciary and those 
experiencing the law within wider society.  
2.6 Feminist Judicial Decision-Making as Judicial Decision-Making: ‘An Equal Justice 
for All’? 
Hunter suggests that the methodological approach contained within the Feminist 
Judgments Project may assist in more effectively addressing the multiple and intersecting 
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social inequalities and injustices produced by traditional approaches towards judicial decision-
making.168 She demonstrates that ‘feminist judges are likely to be concerned to make decisions 
that correct perceived injustices, improve women’s lives and promote substantive equality.’169 
Moreover, she reinforces that feminist judges are likely to exhibit a higher degree of 
consciousness about their beliefs when writing their judicial decisions than the ‘traditional 
judge.’170  
Indeed, while Hunter concedes that the approach adopted by authors within the 
Feminist Judgments Project is similar to that undertaken by traditional judicial decision-makers 
because of its adherence to judicial conventions and constraints, she emphasises that judges 
undertaking a distinctly feminist approach will be more likely to be ‘well-schooled in gender 
issues, feminist theoretical concerns, and to have a particular commitment to gender justice’.171 
Arguably then, feminist judges are more likely to be aware of the historic privileging of male 
interests under the normative male standard of objectivity which operates within existing 
judicial decision-making.172  
Thus, the potential for a greater awareness of the inequalities produced at the root of 
the common law may also assist in dismantling the male-centred approach towards judicial 
decision writing. 173  This is pivotal given the consistent production of the ‘unjust’ and 
‘gendered’ judicial decisions by the existing judicial approach and the threat that these 
decisions pose towards the perceived value and legitimacy of the law. 174  The following 
analysis demonstrates that the greater awareness and consideration by those undertaking 
feminist judicial decision-making cements the Feminist Judgments Project methodology as an 
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ideal approach towards judicial decision-making.  
Despite the potential held by the Feminist Judgments Project to redress various social 
inequalities created by existing approaches towards judicial decision-making, it is precisely 
this attempt to construct a reciprocal relationship between law with feminism which angers 
some feminist scholars.175 In her thesis Feminism and the Power of Law, Smart expresses the 
impossibility for a mutual relationship between feminism and law to exist because of the law’s 
status as an exclusionary masculine and hegemonic discourse, which invalidates all other forms 
of knowledge.176 Indeed, Smart remarks that court and judicial decision-making will always 
preclude alternative visionary approaches to the law from emerging. 177  Thus, Smart 
specifically cautions feminists against resorting to law for the resolution of women’s issues 
because of the law’s ‘malevolence’ to women.178 Although Smart recognises the value inherent 
within feminist critiques of the law, she believes the product of this research should be used to 
challenge masculine power at the root of law, rather than attempting to reform the law with a 
hybrid feminist-legal method.179  
Similarly, Mossman mirrors Smart’s thesis illustrating that the structure of the law 
means that it is ‘impervious’ towards other discourses such as feminism because of the innate 
power of existing approaches towards judicial decision-making and its resistance towards 
alternatives deviating from tradition.180 Mossman’s thesis also alludes to the pedestrian nature 
of existing feminist legal approaches and thus further reducing the potential scope of future 
feminist legal scholarship.181 Mossman remains dubious as to the potential for feminism and 
law to co-exist and cautions that a relationship may only be possible if future feminists provide 
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imaginative and powerful alternatives to traditional legal method.182 
Ultimately, Smart and Mossman’s positions in the late 1980s highlight the law’s 
coerciveness; simultaneously confining feminism to a subservient position because of its 
perpetual yielding to the law’s demands. 183   Smart and Mossman’s respective theses 
demonstrate the illegitimate coupling of law as a brute power and feminism as a weaker and 
subservient alternative. 184  In their eyes, feminism is ‘immobilized’ by traditional judicial 
method, which silences all alternative approaches to law.185 Majury also reflects upon the 
initial feelings of hopelessness expressed by the Women’s Court of Canada because of the 
difficulty in understanding where their combined voices and alternative legal approaches 
would be taken seriously.186 
Smart and Mossman’s unwillingness to accept the potential of a collaboration between 
feminism and traditional judicial method is understandable when considering the law’s 
consistent homogenisation and marginalisation of minority groups. 187  However, scholars 
demonstrate that a credible relationship between law and feminism is achievable without 
sacrificing the law’s structural integrity and feminism’s reputation as an instrument of equality, 
justice, and fairness. 188  Indeed, while Hunter concedes that feminism must perform a 
secondary role to judicial conventions and constraints in order to uphold the feminist judicial 
decision-making as a ‘real-life’ legal exercise, in engaging with judicial decision-making in an 
authentic way with the support of feminism, she also reinforces realist arguments that the law 
is indeterminate to some degree.189 By enabling feminist beliefs to be incorporated within 
judicial decision-making, Hunter highlights the considerable space available for judicial 
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decision writers to draw upon non-legal factors to assist them in selecting between competing 
legal rules and interests.190 Thus, Hunter argues that the indeterminacy at the core of judicial 
decision writing extends considerable discretion to judges, which in turn heightens the potential 
for feminism to play a significant role in judicial decisions in practice.191  
The degree of freedom available to judicial decision makers when writing their 
decisions is accurately encapsulated by the Feminist Judgment Project, as some of the re-
judgments provide the same decision as the original judgments but adopt different styles of 
feminist legal reasoning, while others reach entirely different legal conclusions.192 Therefore, 
although Smart would undoubtedly disapprove of the subservient role played by Feminist 
Judgments Project, Hunter and fellow pioneers of the project strongly advocate that feminist 
judging represents a legitimate and effective method of judicial decision-making. Working 
with traditional judicial conventions, the feminist judgment methodology capitalises on the gap 
created by the indeterminacy inherent within practical judicial decision-making to produce 
more just, equitable, and feminist decisions.193 
 Ultimately, in combining traditional judicial conventions and constraints with feminist 
scholarship and praxis, the methodology contained within the Feminist Judgments Project 
facilitates an opportunity to actively confront and respond effectively to multi-layered issues 
such as: inequality within the law, substantive equality, and women’s live experiences from 
within the law’s borders.194  Thus, although Smart and Mossman’s dissolution with law and 
their aversion to an engagement between traditional legal method and feminism is 
understandable, ultimately their approaches unduly limit the potential for feminist alternatives 
to make a difference.195 
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Indeed, Hunter argues that Smart’s belief that the law and judicial decision-making is 
‘fundamentally anti-feminist’ is ‘too absolutist’. 196  MacKinnon reinforces this belief, as 
arguably within the following excerpt she emphasises the potential inherent within an approach 
such as that contained within the Feminist Judgments Project as a method created by women 
scholars who recognise and attempt to support the need to reform the current common law 
system: 
 
Women have never consented to [law’s] rule – suggesting that the system’s legitimacy 
needs repair that women are in a position to provide.  It will be said that feminist law 
cannot win and will not work. But this is premature. Its possibilities cannot be assessed 
in the abstract but must engage with the world. A feminist theory of the state has barely 
been imagined; systematically, it has never been tried.197 
 
MacKinnon’s faith in the potential for feminist law to work in practice and even ‘win’ 
reinforces the central argument made by this dissertation that feminist judicial decision-making 
features as a transformative and therefore, valuable and legitimate judicial approach.198 Indeed, 
the potential for this method to operate as an emancipatory tool for the traditional judicial 
system is of increased importance, as Gordon explains that because the law is ‘profoundly 
paralysis-inducing because they make it so hard for people (including the ruling classes 
themselves) even to imagine that life could be different and better… people come to 
‘externalize’ [it], to attribute to [it] existence and control over and above human choice; and, 
moreover, to believe that these structures must be the way they are.’199  
                                                        
196 Carol Smart, Feminism and the Power of Law (Routledge, 2002) P 160; Hunter, ‘The Power of Feminist Judgments’ [2012] Feminist Legal 
Studies 142 
197 Catherine A Mackinnon, Toward a Feminist Theory of the State (Harvard University Press, 1989) P 249 
198 Ibid 
199 Robert W. Gordon, ‘New Developments in Legal Theory’ in David Kairys, The Politics of Law A Progressive Critique (2010) 
  
38 
38 
Thus, because the Feminist Judgments Project re-imagines the seemingly unimaginable in an 
accessible and practical manner, arguably the method represents hope in that it demonstrates 
that a different and viable legal approach is possible. President of the Supreme Court, Baroness 
Hale of Richmond echoes these sentiments, as she expresses that the Feminist Judgments 
Project demonstrates that ‘a different perspective can indeed make a difference’.200  
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Chapter 3 Feminist Judicial Decision-Making - A legitimate hybrid critique-reform tool 
to generate legal change: R v Dhaliwal (R v D)201A Case Analysis  
While scholars such as Smart and Mossman seek to dissuade others from the seemingly 
futile exercise of reforming the law with feminism, the Feminist Judgments Project requires 
that contributors undertake a ‘kind of hybrid form of [academic] critique and law reform 
project’.202  This hybrid critique-reform project is achieved by scholars who actively engage in 
a feminist critique of original judicial decisions and then practically reform these decisions 
with the assistance of the findings from their feminist critiques and traditional judicial decision-
making conventions.203 
 Feminist critiques play a fundamental role in the feminist judgment critique-reform 
hybrid. However, as Hunter demonstrates, the feminist re-judgments are not performed ‘simply 
as an academic exercise or for an academic audience’.204 Rather, part of the justification for 
engaging in a hybrid academic critique-law reform approach to judicial decision-making is 
driven by the desire for feminist judicial decision-making to be perceived as a serious and 
legitimate way to instil practical legal change within the ‘real world’. 205  Fundamentally, 
Hunter et al demonstrate that the feminist re-judgments are employed with an extended vision 
in mind: to generate further feminist judgment writing within academia, to induce sustained 
change within the courtroom by judges and advocates, and to change the lives of those 
disadvantaged by law. 206  Thus, Hunter demonstrates that the desire for feminist judicial 
decision-making to be appreciated as a serious and legitimate way of generating sustained legal 
change across a number of spheres necessitates that the project must strike an intricate balance 
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between providing an academic feminist critique of existing decisions and practical legal 
reform.207  
Hunter is reflexive about the reality that an academic feminist approach alone is 
unlikely to make a substantial impact within the lives of those most in need within society.208 
However, she and fellow contributors to the Feminist Judgment Project reject Smart’s more 
reductionist belief that the power of law completely precludes a relationship between law and 
feminism.209 In this sense those engaging in feminist judicial decision-making reflect a more 
realist approach because they believe that the indeterminacy of judicial decision-making 
facilitates an opportunity for feminist approaches to be legitimately incorporated with the law 
to create social change.210 Thus, to ensure that the Feminist Judgments Project is understood 
as an authentic tool for legal reform in practice, contributors illustrate the relationship between 
a more academic feminist critique and practical legal reform as being reciprocal.211 I.e. law 
reform is dependent on a feminist critique of law in its existing state and vice versa: a feminist 
critique of law is redundant without an attempt to reform the existing law.212  
However, one may challenge the value of a feminist judicial decision operating as a 
‘hybrid form of critique-reform’ because Lord Rodger asserts that the proximity between 
academic writing and judgment writing is now non-existent.213 In fact Lord Rodger articulates 
that the judiciary are producing glorified academic articles rather than legal judgments.214 
Thus, Lord Rodger’s perception of judicial decision-making as a form of academic writing 
undermines claims by the Feminist Judgments Project of ‘feminist judgments’ operating as a 
critique-reform hybrid.215  His criticism creates the possibility that feminist judicial decision-
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making is actually an abstract, academic exercise under the guise of being a practical method 
of legal reform. While this sceptical view of feminist judicial decision-making may appear to 
be legitimated by Lord Rodger who illuminates the perceived proximity between academic 
writing and judgment writing, conversely, Rackley restates the distinctiveness of the practice 
of judgment writing and the drive by the Feminist Judgments Project to exploit and harness 
this distinctiveness.216 Ultimately, it is precisely this reciprocal relationship between academic 
critique and legal reform that underpins the value and legitimacy of feminist judicial decision-
making as a socio-legal tool for change and as a method of best judicial practice.217 
The value generated by the Feminist Judgments Project as a hybrid academic critique-
legal reform tool is exemplified by its move beyond rigid, formalist judicial decision-making 
approaches towards embracing the realist, indeterminate nature of judicial decision-making. 
The power of feminist judicial decision-making to protect the legitimacy and the value of 
judicial decision-making through radical doctrinal, policy, and conceptual reform is 
demonstrated within the re-judgment of the landmark case R v Dhaliwal (R v D)218. 
The feminist re-judgment in R v D highlights the opportunity missed by the court in the 
original case to widen the scope of the law under the Offences Against the Person Act 1861 
(OAPA) to ensure that perpetrators of domestic violence are subjected criminal sanctions for 
their abusive conduct.219 The case R v D concerned the victim who took her own life after being 
subjected to sustained psychological and physical abuse by the perpetrator, her husband.220 
Upon the victim’s death, the perpetrator was charged with committing Manslaughter and 
Grievous Bodily Harm contrary to the OAPA 1861.221 Despite evidence by experts that the 
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‘“overwhelming primary cause” for the [victim’s] suicide “was the experience of being 
physically abused by her husband in the context of experiencing many such episodes over a 
very prolonged period of time”’, the CoA decided that the perpetrator could not be held 
accountable for either offence.222  
The court’s decision to acquit the defendant within the case was underpinned by 
evidence from medical experts invoked by the Crown, Dr Chesterman and Dr Agnew-Davies 
who held that there was insufficient evidence to demonstrate that the victim suffered from a 
diagnosable psychological issue.223 However, the expert evidence by Chesterman and Agnew-
Davies was undermined by Dr Mezey who claimed that there was “sufficient evidence” to 
demonstrate that the victim within the case suffered from a psychological condition. 224 
Although Mezey’s evidence suggests that the victim could have been suffering from a 
psychological condition and the court made explicit reference to the evidence found after the 
victim’s death detailing her attempts to self-harm and consume large quantities of alcohol, the 
court relied upon the conclusions made by Chesterman and Agnew-Davies.225 Thus, the court 
acquitted the defendant on the basis that the jury could not properly conclude that the defendant 
was guilty due to the scope of the concept ‘bodily harm’ under OAPA 1861. This statute ‘does 
not allow for un-diagnosed psychological symptoms caused in domestic violence to be 
classified as ‘bodily harm’.226  
The approach by the court in the original decision in R v D is highlighted by Shah, 
Munro, and Burton as being unjust; ineffective, and thus in need of an intervention by feminist 
judicial decision-makers.227 They articulate that in emphasising the need for medical evidence 
to affirm the psychological state of mind of the victim, the court privileges medical knowledge 
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above drawing upon a wide body of social science research.228 Indeed, the original decision 
was made with no reference made to the established body of research on domestic violence 
which demonstrates a clear correlation between the subjection of women to sustained periods 
of domestic violence and their increased experiences of psychological conditions such as 
depression.229 
 In the original decision, the court emphasised a need for medical evidence in the 
interests of ensuring ‘certainty’ for future cases.230 However, as Burton effectively highlights 
even the medical experts within the original case decision could not unanimously agree on 
whether the victim was experiencing a psychological condition, thus generating the very 
uncertainty that the court sought to avoid by relying upon expert medical knowledge.231 In their 
feminist re-judgment, Shah and Munro argue that by prioritising medical knowledge above 
social science research the court in the original decision excludes victims of domestic violence 
who do not have a medically recognised psychological condition from the possibility of legal 
redress.232 The exclusion of victims/survivors of domestic violence from the opportunity of 
accessing justice is reinforced by research by social scientists who demonstrate that victims of 
domestic violence are highly unlikely to seek medical assistance.233 Thus logically in light of 
this research, the majority of domestic violence victims will never be able to access justice and 
accountability, as existing psychological conditions will remain undiagnosed. 
In light of the injustice produced by the approach of the court in the original decision 
of R v D, Burton highlights the need to reform key concepts such as ‘bodily harm’ contained 
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within the OAPA 1861. 234 Burton demonstrates that the reform of this concept is imperative 
to ensure that undiagnosed psychological symptoms can fall under this category without the 
need for a formal medical examination of the victim’s state of mind. 235  Reforming this 
approach to ‘bodily harm’ in practice could ensure that the law provides greater accountability 
for those affected by domestic violence.236  
Similarly, Burton also emphasises the need for a shift in policy around the approach 
towards causation in manslaughter cases where individuals have been subjected to domestic 
violence.237 This is because when causation is followed rigidly, traditional judicial decision-
makers have a tendency to focus on the victim’s ‘voluntary’ act of suicide as the intervening 
act breaking the chain of causation, rather than emphasising this act within the context of the 
catalogue of abuse experienced by the victim.238 Burton highlights that this rigid formalist 
approach towards causation is also flawed in domestic violence proceedings because the 
‘voluntary’ act of suicide by the victim, who has usually been systematically controlled and 
manipulated for a sustained period is judged by the law on the basis that they are an 
‘autonomous person’, rather than acting in light of this period of abuse.239 Arguably, the court’s 
consideration of causation within the original decision is formalist because the court did not 
contextualise causation within the context of the domestic violence which evidently impacted 
on the victim’s conduct and state of mind.240 Rather, it seeks to apply causation in a rigid and 
mechanical fashion when there are clear issues necessitating a more flexible approach to 
causation. 
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The value of the feminist judgment methodology is reinforced by Shah and Munro who 
attempt to move beyond the parameters of the unjust doctrinal and policy approaches of the 
court within the original decision within the feminist re-judgment of R v D.241 Indeed, Shah 
and Munro respond to the need to broaden the concept of ‘bodily harm’ and revise the 
traditional approach to causation within domestic violence proceedings as highlighted by the 
original approach of the court in R v D.242 Within their re-judgment, they illustrate that the 
definition of ‘bodily harm’ contained within OAPA 1861 could be legitimately reformed to 
better support victims and survivors of domestic violence where the abuse committed by the 
perpetrator does not fall strictly under the existing category of ‘bodily harm’.243 To this end, 
Shah and Munro attempt to provide a more open, flexible interpretation of ‘bodily harm’ in 
order to ensure that the perpetrator is held accountable for their actions.244 In doing so, the 
feminist re-judgment  transcends the parameters of the existing concept of ‘bodily harm’ and 
re-centres its focus upon supporting victims and survivors of domestic violence; rather than 
upon continuing their punitive treatment of victims in seeking for evidence of their 
psychological conditions.245  
The re-approach proposed by Munro and Shah could result in a higher degree of 
flexibility afforded to courts around the concept of ‘bodily harm’ in practice to ensure that 
victims/survivors of domestic violence who are subjected to ‘non-fatal’ offences, but who 
cannot be protected under the OAPA 1861 due to the present narrow definition of ‘bodily harm’ 
are still supported.246 Burton articulates this specific approach to ‘bodily harm’ and causation 
                                                        
241 Mandy Burton, ‘Commentary on R v Dhaliwal’ in Rosemary Hunter, Clare McGlynn, and Erika Rackley, Feminist Judgments From Theory 
to Practice (Hart Publishing, 2010) P 255; R v D [2006] EWCA Crim 1139, [2006] 2 Cr. App R 24 (CA) 
242 Mandy Burton, ‘Commentary on R v Dhaliwal’ in Rosemary Hunter, Clare McGlynn, and Erika Rackley, Feminist Judgments From Theory 
to Practice (Hart Publishing, 2010) P 255; R v D [2006] EWCA Crim 1139, [2006] 2 Cr. App R 24 (CA) 
243 Mandy Burton, ‘Commentary on R v Dhaliwal’ in Rosemary Hunter, Clare McGlynn, and Erika Rackley, Feminist Judgments From Theory 
to Practice (Hart Publishing, 2010) P 255; R v D [2006] EWCA Crim 1139, [2006] 2 Cr. App R 24 (CA) 
244 Mandy Burton, ‘Commentary on R v Dhaliwal’ in Rosemary Hunter, Clare McGlynn, and Erika Rackley, Feminist Judgments From Theory 
to Practice (Hart Publishing, 2010) P 260 
245 Mandy Burton, ‘Commentary on R v Dhaliwal’ in Rosemary Hunter, Clare McGlynn, and Erika Rackley, Feminist Judgments From Theory 
to Practice (Hart Publishing, 2010) P 259 
246 Mandy Burton, ‘Commentary on R v Dhaliwal’ in Rosemary Hunter, Clare McGlynn, and Erika Rackley, Feminist Judgments From Theory 
to Practice (Hart Publishing, 2010)  P 260 
  
46 
46 
as assisting in the wider goal set by feminist scholars to ensure that the criminal justice system 
adequately responds to both the perpetrators and victims/survivors of domestic violence.247 
Therefore, in considering the positive impact generated by the interaction between a 
feminist critique of existing judgments and the subsequent feminist re-judgment of the original 
decision in R v D, arguably the distinct value of the feminist judgment methodology lies in the 
reciprocal relationship between legal critique and legal reform. Indeed, in operating between 
critique and reform, the Feminist Judgments Project may be said to adopt a ‘sceptical 
pragmatist’ approach to judgment writing in that they ‘embrace legalism as a tool of necessity’ 
but they also ‘stand outside the courtroom door’.248 In other words, contributors strike the 
balance between critiquing the law from a more theoretical, feminist critical standpoint ‘outside 
the courtroom door’ and then recognising the need to engage with this law from the ‘inside’ by 
reforming judicial decisions from a feminist standpoint.249 Thus, rather than mirroring the 
‘absolutist’ recommendations to cease from engaging with law to reform by Smart, feminist 
judicial decision-making works to bridge the gap between more engaging with abstract feminist 
principles and practical forms of legal reasoning in the hope of generating more fair and just 
results for society.250 As re-affirmed by Hunter, this approach is taken not because feminist 
judicial decision-makers neglect the limitations of law reform, nor do they accept the operation 
law in its entirety.251 Rather, contributors to the Feminist Judgments Project recognise the 
reality that the law plays a pivotal role in the lives of women and sometimes an engagement 
with law is necessary to achieve wider social justice objectives.252  
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In inhabiting the role of the ‘sceptical pragmatist’ and approaching legal reform through 
some traditional judicial means, Shah and Munro transform the courtroom as a forum 
previously identified by Smart as a sphere in which to ‘silence’ women into a tool in which to 
centralise women’s specific issues and concerns, particularly within the realm of domestic 
violence.253 Indeed, in facilitating the re-interpretation of ‘bodily harm’, Shah and Munro can 
be said to effectively ‘challenge the majority’s story and weaken its hold on our collective 
imagination’ in the context of domestic violence. 254  In other words, they utilise feminist 
knowledge and the traditional legal system to critique and challenge the traditional approach 
to judgment writing within proceedings concerning domestic violence and in doing so they 
open our collective minds to the prospect of a new approach.255 Ultimately, in balancing legal 
reform with a critique of law from a feminist perspective within their re-judgment of R v D, 
Shah and Munro reinforce Hunter’s belief that a genuine engagement with the law from the 
inside holds great potential for transformative practical legal change.256 
Arguably, the potential for the Feminist Judgments Project to modify established legal 
doctrine and policy in order to create more ‘just’ judicial outcomes cements feminist judicial 
decision-making as the mode of best judicial practice. This is because the feminist re-
judgments provide an opportunity to rectify the various injustices identified by feminist 
scholars within original judicial decisions; and as such these reduce the threat that these 
injustices pose to the perceived legitimacy and value of the law.257  
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Chapter 4 Conclusion - Feminist Judicial Decision-Making as Judicial Decision-Making: 
A Legitimate and Valuable Approach? 
This dissertation commended the commitment of the judiciary and the JAC to 
improving the external legitimacy of the common law by appointing a more diverse 
judiciary.258 However, while this was praised, this dissertation identified the active failure and 
neglect by judges to engage with and to analyse their existing and formalist approaches towards 
judicial decision-making. The dissertation emphasised that the reluctance by the judiciary to 
engage critically with their decision-making approaches continued, even as feminist scholars 
unearthed the judiciary’s production of ‘unjust’ and ‘wrong’ judicial decisions.259   
The dissertation demonstrated two of the main implications arising from the judiciary’s 
failure to critically engage with their approaches to judicial decision-making. Firstly, in failing 
to engage with their approaches towards judicial decision-making and by avoiding discussions 
about judicial decision-making more widely, the judiciary was identified as endangering 
women and minority groups to further levels of injustice. 260  Secondly, the judiciary’s 
continued treatment of women in an ‘unjust’ manner was depicted as undermining the 
legitimacy and the value of the common law because as recognised, the legitimacy of the law 
is inextricably linked with perceptions of the law as an arbiter of justice and fairness.261 In 
compromising the legitimacy of the common law, the judiciary was identified as diminishing 
the status of the law more widely, and even creating the potential for disobedience and unrest 
within wider society.262 As demonstrated in treating women in a disproportionately ‘unjust’ 
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and ‘wrong’ manner, the judiciary was depicted as disadvantaging the needs, experiences, and 
interests of women.263  
In addition, the dissertation highlighted the judiciary’s complicity in damaging the 
legitimacy of the common law and its wider value because of the judiciary’s awareness of the 
distinct experiences and needs of women within the judicial decision-making system.264 Not 
only did the dissertation highlight the judiciary’s awareness of the distinct experiences of 
women in the judicial decision-making process, but it also highlighted the discretion available 
for judges to respond to these needs.265 Ultimately, the treatment of women in this way was 
highlighted as reinforcing the inadequacy of the present formalist approach to judicial decision-
making.266  
The dissertation provided a realist critique of present formalist approaches towards 
judicial decision-making and identified the promotion of formalist approaches towards judicial 
decision-making by the wider public and media. The project identified the inherent 
contradictions, mistruths, and reductionist conceptions of judicial decision-making from the 
perspective of formalism. 267  The deconstruction of formalist approaches towards judicial 
decision-making facilitated the illustration of the methodology contained within the Feminist 
Judgments Project as a realist approach to judicial decision-making. This was achieved by 
dismantling formalist conceptions of judicial decision-making as a completely autonomous and 
rule-based exercise and the problems arising from promoting the pretence of a formalist 
approach to judicial decision-making. 268  In evaluating the formalist approach to judicial 
decision-making combined with the inequalities arising from an attempt to maintain a formalist 
                                                        
263 Rosemary Hunter, ‘The Power of Feminist Judgments’ (2012) 20 Feminist Legal Studies 137 
Mairead Enright, Julie McCandless and Aoife O’Donoghue, Northern/Irish Feminist Judgments: Judges’ Troubles and the Gendered Politics 
of Identity (Hart Publishing, 2017) P 3 
Bridget J Crawford, Anthony C Infanti, Feminist Judgments: Rewritten Tax Opinions (CUP, 2017) P 45 
264 Judicial Studies Board, Equal Treatment Bench Book (Judicial Studies Board, September 2008) 6-1 
265 Ibid and Hanoch Dagan, ‘The Realist Conception of Law’ (2007) 57 University of Toronto Law Journal 656 
266 Rosemary Hunter, ‘The Power of Feminist Judgments’ (2012) 20 Feminist Legal Studies 137 
Adam Gearey and John Gardner, Law and Aesthetics (Hart Publishing, 2001) P 2 
267 Hanoch Dagan, ‘The Realist Conception of Law’ (2007) 57 University of Toronto Law Journal 611 
268 Terence Etherton, ‘Liberty, the archetype and diversity: a philosophy of judging’ [2010] Public Law 8, 9 
  
50 
50 
approach to decision-making in practice, the literature review highlighted the potential for the 
Feminist Judgments Project to rectify these issues in a more considered and ‘just’ way.269 The 
dissertation identified feminist judicial decision-making as a realist project because it discerns 
and embraces the gap generated by the indeterminacy of the law and seeks to plug this gap 
with feminist reasoning techniques in order to create more just outcomes.270 The literature 
review considered the views of Smart and Mossman and the counter-arguments provided by 
Hunter et al regarding the possibility for the Feminist Judgments Project to feature as a 
legitimate and distinctive approach towards judicial decision-making.271   
In response to the judiciary’s production of ‘unjust’ judicial decisions as a result of the 
formalist tendencies of judicial decision-makers, the dissertation placed its focus on calls by 
feminist legal scholars for a distinctly feminist approach to judicial decision-making.272 This 
dissertation analysed a feminist re-judgment contained within the Feminist Judgments Project 
in the interests of promoting fairness, and fundamentally an ‘equal justice for all’ within the 
judicial decision-making process. 273  This analysis was undertaken because of the 
disproportionate levels of criticism aimed at judges who appear to be, or who are openly 
incorporating feminist beliefs into their judicial decision-making approach and the continued 
‘fetishization’ of the legal status quo by the judiciary.274 The analysis identified the invaluable 
nature of feminist judicial decision-making because of its response to the distinct needs and 
interests of vulnerable women as in R v Dhaliwal.275 In responding to the distinct issues faced 
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by Dhaliwal through the means of a hybrid feminist-judicial decision-making, the analysis 
demonstrated that feminist judicial decision-making might be recognised as a legitimate form 
of judicial decision-making.276 This is because in responding to these issues in Dhaliwal, 
feminist judicial decision-making moves beyond an academic feminist critique to provide a 
more ‘just’ outcome for a variety of people who are neglected by existing judicial approaches. 
Thus, in light of the greater sense of justice produced by feminist judicial decision-making, the 
feminist judicial decision-making approach was identified as an appropriate way of saving the 
legitimacy and value of the common law.277 
Overall, this dissertation argues that feminist judicial decision-making represents a 
legitimate and valuable approach to judicial decision-making because of its considered 
approach towards the distinct needs of women within the boundaries of existing judicial 
conventions and constraints. Although the analysis of the approach within the Feminist 
Judgments Project is limited due to the length of this piece, the findings demonstrate the 
potential for this judicial decision-making approach to be ingrained as a mode of judicial best-
practice. This is because the project remains faithful to existing judicial conventions, however 
in discerning the gap available within the judicial decision-making process, contributors 
identify a way to incorporate a more academic feminist critique and knowledge.  
In future research, it is suggested that a larger scale review of feminist re-judgments 
ought to be conducted across all of the published global Feminist Judgments Projects with the 
aim of cataloguing the key impact(s) of feminist judicial decision-making upon the law and 
society more broadly. The findings from this research could then be compiled into a policy 
document to highlight the seriousness of unjust judicial decision-making with regards to 
undermining the legitimacy and value of the law, and the ability of feminist judicial decision-
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making to support the common law’s legitimacy. This could then assist in shifting feminist 
judicial decision-making from the realms of ‘alternative-dom’ towards a normative approach 
to judicial decision-making in turn reflecting Hunter’s wider objective for feminist judicial 
decision-making to feature more in academic and practical spheres.278   
 To conclude, feminist judicial decision-making is reinforced as a legitimate and 
valuable socio-legal and realist approach to judicial decision-making because of its potential 
to generate genuine legal change and to reduce unfair, ‘unjust’ and gendered judicial decisions. 
Ultimately, where existing judicial decision-making approaches fail, the Feminist Judgments 
Project responds. Although the accommodation of feminism and law may be initially difficult, 
the Feminist Judgments Project demonstrates that judicial decision-making may legitimately 
incorporate a more academic feminist critique of law into judicial decision-making in order to 
generate a viable path for change and justice. 
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